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INTRODUCTION 
Cohabitation is the new normal.1 Today’s normal, however, can be 
confusing to a generation that grew up with marriage as the only option 
for romantic couples. But to today’s couples, cohabitation is either an 
alternative to marriage or a stepping-stone to marriage. Contemporary 
studies have shown that the majority of those who get married today are 
wealthy white couples.2 Meanwhile, women of lower socioeconomic 
status are less likely to get married.3 Instead, these women push for 
cohabitation to protect their assets, and they have become the driving force 
behind the shift from marriage to cohabitation.4  
Historically, Louisiana stigmatized women who chose cohabitation, 
referring to them as concubines and denying them legal rights.5 Beginning 
in the 1970s, most states began to recognize and respond to the injustices 
that the stigmatization of cohabitation created.6 For example, dissolution 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by BRITTANIE WAGNON. 
 1. Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of 
Research Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 4–5 (2000); 
see infra Part I.  
 2. See Smock, supra note 1, at 4–5; Marin Clarkberg, The Price of Partnering: 
The Role of Economic Well-Being in Young Adults’ First Union Experiences, 77 
SOC. FORCES 945, 947 (1999). 
 3. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 947; Smock, supra note 1, at 4.  
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. For an explanation of Louisiana’s historical view of concubinage, see 
Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1129 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Succession of Filhiol, 44 So. 843 (La. 1907)). 
 6. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (allowing 
a cohabiting woman to recover under contract theory to prevent inequity). 




of a relationship by death or separation often left a woman destitute.7 To 
correct this inequity, every other community property state in the United 
States now provides a remedy for cohabitants to claim property rights upon 
dissolution of the relationship.8 Overall, 46 states have created some sort 
of contractual or status-based remedy for this inequity.9 In the midst of the 
United States’ movement to accept cohabiting couples that has gained 
traction and entrenched itself over the past 40 years, Louisiana’s 
stubborn refusal to follow the rest of the country’s example is puzzling.  
This Comment offers a solution to that puzzle, arguing that 
Louisiana’s refusal to provide property rights for unmarried cohabitants 
is the result of discrimination against some of the state’s neediest 
citizens.10 Louisiana’s jurisprudence often provides unfair results to 
women, and when accompanied by statistics showing that women are the 
main advocates of cohabitation,11 Louisiana’s refusal to act appears 
motivated by a desire to discriminate. This failure to change the law is a 
thinly veiled attempt to retain the status quo of the past where marriage 
was the only path for women to be successful. To correct the situation, 
this Comment proposes a solution that is best aligned with Louisiana’s 
needs—a presumption of an equal-sharing agreement between romantic 
partners upon dissolution. 
Part I demonstrates that the significant number of cohabiting couples 
creates a need for the legislature to act, and also explores who engages in 
cohabitation and why the practice has become so popular. Part II describes 
the evolution of cohabitants’ rights in the American courts and legislatures. 
This Part also surveys the various approaches in the United States, New 
Zealand, and France to afford rights to cohabitants. Part III explains 
Louisiana’s archaic views regarding unmarried cohabitation and why the 
State chooses to cling to this reasoning. Part IV scrutinizes the sexist biases 
in Louisiana’s jurisprudence and argues that Louisiana can no longer justify 
discriminating against cohabitants. This Part also proposes a solution that 
                                                                                                             
 7. See id. at 109 (noting that the plaintiff agreed to stop working and be the 
defendant’s housekeeper in return for his financial support). 
 8. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 587 (2013). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Even though marriage as an institution offers concrete benefits and 
protections for many, the Louisiana Civil Code currently excludes from this 
category not only unmarried heterosexual cohabitants, but also homosexuals. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 89 (2014). See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14–556 (U.S. 
2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses require a state to license a marriage between two people of the 
same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when 
their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed in another state). 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 




will fix the frequent inequity in Louisiana and calls for the change women 
deserve—the ability to decide for themselves whether marriage is indeed 
the best option by which to transfer property rights.  
I. FIRST COMES LOVE, THEN COMES MARRIAGE? 
The number of couples choosing cohabitation instead of marriage has 
grown exponentially over the years and it continues to rise.12 Cohabitation 
is popular because of society’s need for individualism, its changing values, 
and economic factors unique to modern culture.13 Women of lower 
socioeconomic status14 and working women have been the main 
proponents behind cohabitation’s popularity.15 Many women choose not 
to marry to protect their economic freedom. Cohabitation is more popular 
among poor women because marriage seems to represent a wealthy status 
symbol, and the housewife stigma associated with marriage troubles some 
career women.16 Because of this desire, cohabitation has become an 
important family status in America.  
A. The Explosive Growth of Cohabitation and Its Clouded Origins 
Chabitation is the most common path to initiating family life.17 In 
1960, approximately 440,000 unmarried American couples were living 
together.18 By 1990, the number had climbed to 2.85 million and continued 
climbing to 4.9 million in early 2000.19 In 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau 
                                                                                                             
 12. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946; see also Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces 
Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
135, 159–60 (2005).  
 13. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946. 
 14. Smock, supra note 1, at 4. 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 957–58. 
 17. See id. at 945. This Comment considers the term “family life” to mean 
“the basic unit in society traditionally consisting of two parents rearing their 
children” and “any of various social units differing from but regarded as 
equivalent to the traditional family.” Full Definition of Family, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/family (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2015).  
 18. Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting 
Children Inside and Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 752 (2010).  
 19. Id. The number of unmarried couples who are cohabitating has expanded 
overall by 1,000%, from 500,000 in 1970 to over 5,000,000 in 2000. V. Michael 
Brigner, Cohabitation, in BALDWIN’S OHIO PRAC. DOMESTIC REL. L. § 2:66 (4th 
ed. 2014). 




reported that for the first time in history, married couples made up less 
than half of all American households.20 By 2011, 7.6 million opposite-sex 
couples were living together as unmarried cohabitants.21 Further, the 
majority of marriages and remarriages begin as cohabiting relationships.22  
Although cohabitation has grown in popularity exponentially, the 
reasons for this phenomenon are much less clear. Sociologists point to 
three factors that contribute to this change:23 (1) the shifting values in 
modern society, (2) the American need for individual autonomy, and (3) a 
changing economic climate.24 Historically, American values developed 
from “religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless change, vast 
opportunity, and fluid social structure.”25 Core values shift over time 
among individuals in keeping with the American spirit of change.26 These 
shifts in values and attitudes about gender roles have made cohabitation 
more popular.27 
Cohabitation is appealing to young adults because of its consistency 
with individualism and secularism as compared to marriage.28 Cohabitors 
tend to reject traditional gender roles while embracing the ideals of 
individualism, personal autonomy, and equity in each partner’s 
contribution to the household.29 Those who choose to cohabit are generally 
more liberal, less religious, and more supportive of both egalitarian gender 
roles and nontraditional family roles.30 Young adults’ attitudes toward 
                                                                                                             
 20. Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples are No Longer a Majority, Census 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A22; see also Mark Mather & Diana Lavery, 
In U.S., Proportion Married at Lowest Recorded Levels, PRB (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.prb.org/Articles/2010/usmarriagedecline.aspx; see also Aloni, supra 
note 8, at 580.  
 21. Aloni, supra note 8, at 580; see also Mather & Lavery, supra note 20; see 
also Tavernise, supra note 20.  
 22. Smock, supra note 1, at 1. 
 23. Id. at 5; see also Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946. 
 24. Smock, supra note 1, at 5; see also Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946. 
 25. Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 175, 180 (2012) (quoting ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 440, 458–59 (3d ed. 1970)).  
 26. Id. at 181. 
 27. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946. 
 28. Smock, supra note 1, at 5. 
 29. Jules Brine & Kara Joyner, The Ties That Bind: Principles of Cohesion 
in Cohabitation and Marriage, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 333, 351 (1999). 
 30. Smock, supra note 1, at 4. 




divorce are also changing.31 The very real threat of a failed marriage leads 
many couples to experiment with cohabitation as a type of trial period.32  
Economic factors unique to modern culture have also increased the 
allure of cohabitation.33 These factors include the rising rate of female 
participation in the labor force and the decline of wealth during young 
adulthood.34 Financial obstacles provide one of the main reasons for why 
many couples choose cohabitation over marriage.35 Those couples that 
cohabit are generally in worse financial shape than couples that get married, 
and long periods of unemployment, lower educational attainment, and lower 
joint incomes characterize their relationships.36 For those uncertain about 
their financial prospects, living together and pooling resources in the short 
run can be a smarter strategy than simply living alone.37 Therefore, 
economic instability pushes couples toward living together and away from 
getting married. 
Meanwhile, marriage is now something of a status symbol for wealthy 
couples. Social norms dictate an “acceptable” standard of living for married 
couples, which puts pressure on adults to make a certain amount of money 
before getting married.38 Many couples feel as if they lack the resources to 
receive the social sanctioning of their union through marriage.39 Although 
sharing a house should, as a practical matter, be cheaper than living alone, 
social definitions of a suitable standard of living for a married couple make 
marriage the more expensive choice.40 In contrast, cohabitation is a non-
institutionalized type of union that carries minimal normative standards. The 
failure to meet a “suitable” level of income is not a barrier to cohabitation.41 
Thus, cohabitation is a viable option for couples in the midst of changing 
values and an uncertain financial outlook. 
                                                                                                             
 31. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 947 (“[P]eople who cohabit differ economically from people who 
marry.”). Some have even dubbed cohabitation the “poor man’s marriage.” Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 963. 
 38. Id. at 949. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 950. 
 41. Id. at 951. 




B. Women’s Push for Cohabitation 
Women are the driving force behind the increase in the rate of 
cohabitation. Women across the economic spectrum choose cohabitation 
to financially protect themselves. The practice of cohabitation is most 
common among two groups of women: working women and those of low 
socioeconomic status.42 The line between employed women and poor 
women, however, is not a bright one. The reason is because women 
typically accumulate less wealth than men due to inequalities in labor force 
participation and earnings.43 This result is particularly true in Louisiana, 
where a noticeably large pay gap between men and women persists.44 
Although employed, women who earn less than their male counterparts 
and women with low income and education have low marriage rates and 
usually cohabit, but more-advantaged women tend to get married.45 
Marriage is not as well suited for women in poverty as is cohabitation. 
Low-income women face many barriers to marriage, including: gender 
mistrust, abuse, infidelity, and financial strain.46 Marriage can create 
dependencies on men, particularly in abusive relationships and other 
situations that are ultimately unhealthy for the women involved.47 
Marriage jeopardizes eligibility for welfare benefits, forcing poor couples 
to choose between being married without welfare or remaining unmarried 
with welfare.48 As a result, cohabiting women who receive welfare are 
                                                                                                             
 42. See id. at 956–57 (“In contrast to men, women with high earnings appear 
to be relatively more attracted to cohabitation than men.”); Smock, supra note 1, 
at 4. 
 43. Jonathan Vespa & Matthew A. Painter II, Cohabitation History, 
Marriage, and Wealth Accumulation, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 983, 985 (2011).  
 44. Janet McConnaughey, Louisiana has Nation’s Biggest Pay Gap Between 
Men and Women, WWLTV.COM (Sept. 18, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://www.wwltv.com 
/story/news/local/2014/09/18/pay-gap-louisiana/15834737/ (“Louisiana has the 
nation’s largest gender pay gap, with women paid about two thirds of what men are 
paid . . . .”).  
 45. Vespa & Painter, supra note 43, at 998; see also Daniel T. Lichter, 
Zhenchao Qian & Leanna M. Mellott, Marriage or Dissolution? Union 
Transitions Among Poor Cohabiting Women, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 223, 237 (2006). 
 46. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 225.  
 47. Deborah Roempke Graefe & Daniel T. Lichter, Marriage Among Unwed 
Mothers: Whites, Blacks and Hispanics Compared, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 286, 292 (2002) (“For some women, however, [marriage] may 
also create new dependencies on men that are ultimately unhealthy for everyone 
involved—for example, in the case of abusive relationships.”).  
 48. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 226.  




40% less likely to make the transition to marriage than those who do not 
receive welfare.49 
Women in poverty are not the only group that prefers cohabitation; 
employed women also endorse cohabitation—albeit for a vastly different 
reason. Working women see cohabitation as a way to protect their 
economic assets. As more women have abandoned the traditional 
homemaker role to work in the labor market, their financial independence 
has increased.50 Unlike their male counterparts, marriage can hinder 
women’s efforts to build successful careers.51 Although society has 
traditionally assumed that women desired marriage for economic stability, 
increased labor opportunities enable women to avoid marrying.52 Domestic 
activity after marriage, particularly housework, typically increases for women 
and decreases for men, which is a factor in why career women decide either 
to not get married or to delay marriage.53 Women who have high earnings are 
more attracted to cohabitation than marriage because of the stigma and social 
expectation that a wife completes all of the household labor.54 Nonmarital 
unions, however, are attractive because cohabiters in these arrangements 
have greater equality than their marital counterparts who tend to adhere 
more often to gender role stereotypes.55 Women in the labor force choose 
cohabitation as the rational economic choice to deal with a gender-specific 
hindrance to their careers that men do not have.  
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ RESPONSES TO COHABITATION 
Before the 1970s, America traditionally gave cohabitants a negative 
status in the law and prohibited unmarried sexual partners from 
contracting with each other. This status, however, produced inequities 
where, upon dissolution, the male partner walked away with all of the 
assets while the woman was left without a way of earning income. As a 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 234.  
 50. Id. at 225.  
 51. Sharon Sassler & Robert Schoen, The Effect of Attitudes and Economic 
Activity on Marriage, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 147, 149 (1999). 
 52. Id. at 148 (“Women were traditionally assumed to desire marriage (due 
to economic dependency) more than men, but the increased economic opportunity 
enables women to avoid marrying.”).  
 53. Id. at 149 (“Despite the widespread acceptance of women’s employment, 
marriage appears to be less compatible with women’s efforts to build successful 
careers than with men’s efforts. . . . Domestic activity after marriage, particularly 
the amount of housework done, increases more for women than for men.”). 
 54. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 956–57. 
 55. Id. at 962. 




result, America abandoned this negative view in the 1970s, and most states 
have since afforded some sort of mechanism for providing property rights 
for unmarried cohabitants.56 Although the reasons for affording 
cohabitating couples relief has changed, as the role of women in the 
workforce has transformed, the problem of inequity still remains. 
Louisiana remains one of only four states that have refused to provide 
property rights for unmarried cohabitants, although other jurisdictions 
employ various avenues for affording these rights.57 Other jurisdictions 
employ a status approach, contract approach, or a blend of the two 
approaches to provide property rights.58  
A. The American View of Cohabitation: Before and After 
America originally viewed cohabitation negatively and did not allow 
property rights to unmarried cohabitants, which produced inequitable 
results.59 Recognizing these results, the California Supreme Court decided the 
landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin, which allowed cohabitants the right to 
contract between each other regarding property.60 After this decision, many 
states began to recognize the inequity of disallowing unmarried cohabitants’ 
property rights.61 Therefore, the Marvin decision led many states to 
completely change their view towards cohabitation and created a shift in 
attitudes, which ultimately led to the overall acceptance of cohabiting 
relationships throughout the country.62  
1. The Traditional Negative Status 
Historically, America attributed a negative legal status to unmarried 
cohabiting couples.63 Most legal statuses come with rights and 
                                                                                                             
 56. Glover, supra note 18, at 756; see also Aloni, supra note 8, at 587. 
 57. See Aloni, supra note 8, at 587 (“Only Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and 
Louisiana do not recognize cohabitants’ right to contract regarding their rights 
and responsibilities toward each other.”).  
 58. See infra Part II.C. 
 59. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 60. 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 61. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 62. Id.  
 63. William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried 
Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44. LA. L. REV. 1677, 
1677 (1984); 1 LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 
1:5, at 6 (2008) (“The term ‘legal status’ is used in the law to refer to a relationship 
between persons that, by virtue of its existence, entails legal consequences.”).  




obligations,64 but this unique negative status prevented unmarried 
cohabitants from contracting with each other.65 Marriage was customarily 
the only option for romantic couples to transfer property rights and other 
benefits between one another.66 The official purpose of marriage was to 
channel the sexual desire between a man and a woman into an acceptable 
institution that could provide a stable environment for any resulting 
children.67 The government was interested in the purity of marriage 
because the institution was supposedly “the foundation of the family and 
of society.”68 This positive view of marriage caused the courts to attach a 
negative stigma to cohabitation.69 Society ostracized couples choosing 
cohabitation over wedlock for “living in sin” and classified those couples 
as deviants.70 Courts viewed nonmarital cohabitation as “illicit” or 
“meretricious” until 1976.71  
                                                                                                             
 64. Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: 
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1265, 1272 (2001) (“In marriage, rights and benefits accrue to parties during 
their relationship by virtue of their marital status.”). 
 65. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1677 (arguing that instead of creating rights and 
obligations between unmarried cohabitants like most legal statuses, the United 
States imposed a unique negative legal status that disabled couples from 
contracting with each other). 
 66. Id. at 1680.  
 67. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible 
Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 250 (2003). 
Although this article speaks to Louisiana’s experience with marriage, the 
Louisiana experience illustrates what has happened throughout the rest of the 
United States. Id. at 244. 
 68. Hurry v. Hurry, 81 So. 378, 381 (La. 1919) (noting that marriage is an 
institution “in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply 
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society” (quoting Maynard 
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888))). 
 69. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1679 (“First, the courts felt it an appropriate 
judicial function to condemn and punish cohabitants for their immorality in 
engaging in sexual relations without the benefits of marriage.”). 
 70. Glover, supra note 18, at 751. 
 71. Brigner, supra note 19, § 2:66 (stating that “illicit” in this context means 
“prohibited” and “meretricious” means “pertaining to an unlawful sexual 
connection” and derives from the Latin word for prostitute); see also Marvin v. 
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding that contracts between 
unmarried partners are enforceable, unless they were explicitly founded on sexual 
services similar to that of prostitution, which would violate public policy). Marvin 
ignited the trend away from a qualified disapproval of unmarried cohabitation. Id. 




2. Inequity Caused by the Traditional View in America Transformed 
the Law 
The public deemed cohabitation sinful, and the traditional American 
view of unmarried cohabitants created inequitable results for partners 
upon dissolution of the relationship. Courts’ decisions to follow precedent 
that rendered agreements between partners unenforceable because they 
were based upon the void consideration of sexual services produced 
“cruelly unfair results.”72 Courts did not give unmarried cohabitants a 
legally significant family status, which resulted in distinct hardships.73 
Specifically, inequities often arose where the male cohabitant produced all 
of the earnings and the female cohabitant produced none.74 In these cases, 
the working partner, typically the man, would retain all of the family assets 
because unmarried cohabitants were not subject to community property 
laws.75 The law left the female partner without a remedy for such a dire 
situation.  
Because of the frequency with which this inequity occurred, courts 
began to realize that lower-earning partners were in need of protection 
from partners with more money who might take advantage of them.76 
Before this realization, courts permitted the man to dishonor his equal-
sharing contract—a contract where cohabitants worked together as an 
economic unit pursuant to an implied or express agreement concerning the 
nature of their earnings.77 By dishonoring this contract, the man was 
allowed to double the amount of gain he expected to have as his own when 
the relationship ended.78 That harsh treatment failed to provide at least one 
party in the relationship, usually the woman, with property rights as 
punishment for the couple’s “illicit” relationship.79 This inequity caused 
most of the country to develop a method of rectifying the problem, and to 
abandon the traditionally negative status given to unmarried cohabitants.80 
                                                                                                             
 72. Brigner, supra note 19, § 2:66. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Charlotte K. Goldberg, Opting In, Opting Out: Autonomy in the 
Community Property States, 72 LA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2011).  
 75. Id. 
 76. Charlotte K. Goldberg, Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and 
Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 487 
(2007).  
 77. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Symposium: Family Law, Introduction, 44 LA. L. 
REV. 1545, 1550 (1984).  
 78. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1681.  
 79. Goldberg, supra note 76, at 538.  
 80. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 159–60. 




Nearly every state adopted an approach to honor agreements between 
cohabitants, with only Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana 
maintaining the antiquated approach.81  
B. Approaches Used by Multiple Jurisdictions  
Three predominant methods have emerged for dealing with unmarried 
cohabitants’ property rights. The first is the legal status approach, which 
imposes legal consequences based simply on the existence of a relationship 
between two persons.82 The American Law Institute has endorsed this 
approach.83 Foreign jurisdictions such as New Zealand can provide further 
guidance on the legal status approach.84 The second, more common, 
approach uses contract remedies to provide property rights upon dissolution 
of the relationship.85 The third approach, which blends both the status and 
contract approaches, is the French PACS, an intermediate contract-based 
legal status that is not equivalent to marriage.86  
1. The Imposition of a Legal Status 
One way to afford cohabitants’ property rights is to impose a legal status 
upon the parties if they meet certain requirements. There are multiple avenues 
to implement the legal status approach, including the use of the following: (1) 
common law marriage, (2) American Law Institute’s Chapter 6 Principles, (3) 
Washington’s “Committed Intimate Relationship” Status, and (4) New 
Zealand’s domestic partnership status.  
a. The “Not-So-Common” Law Marriage Approach  
The status approach in the United States has its origins in the doctrine 
of common law marriage, which turns cohabitation into a lawful marriage 
if the parties agree between themselves to be married and live together for 
                                                                                                             
 81. Glover, supra note 18, at 756; see also Aloni, supra note 8, at 587.  
 82. KELSO, supra note 63, § 1.5, at 6.  
 83. Eric L. Olsen, Note, How Do Courts Divide Property Acquired During a 
Psuedomarital (Meretricious) Relationship?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 1091, 1092 
(1992); Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried Cohabitation—The New Zealand 
Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303, 303 (2003); David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of 
Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001). 
 84. See infra Part II.C.1.d. 
 85. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).  
 86. See infra Part II.C.3.  




a substantial period of time.87 Throughout the United States, however, 
states have largely abolished this outdated practice.88 Courts originally 
created common law marriage in the 1800s to legitimize cohabitation by a 
couple who sought to be married lawfully but lived so far from the county 
seat that travel by horseback to the courthouse to obtain a marriage license 
would not have been feasible.89 Although Louisiana will recognize 
common law marriages from other states, the state has rejected this 
approach by first criminalizing cohabitation and then later refusing to 
affirmatively adopt common law marriage in its Civil Code.90 
b. The ALI’s 2001 Chapter 6 Principles: A Revival of Common Law 
Marriage? 
In 2001, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) promulgated principles 
that suggested a new status similar to that of common law marriage.91 The 
ALI principles presuppose that long-term stable cohabitation gives rise to 
the rights and responsibilities of marriage.92 The purposes of the ALI’s 
Chapter 6 principles were to “enhance and safeguard the rights of . . . 
cohabitants” while “diminish[ing] the possibility that those rights may be 
reduced or eliminated by an agreement of the parties.”93 Put simply, the 
promulgators of ALI’s principles believed that eligible unmarried couples 
should have the same economic rights as spouses at the time of relationship 
dissolution. This includes equitable distribution of property and debts 
acquired during the relationship and compensatory payments to replace 
alimony and spousal maintenance.94 Although this solution was 
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Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law 
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unsuccessful, the ALI’s Chapter 6 Principles established a need for the law 
to recognize unmarried cohabitation as an important family status.95  
c. Washington’s Unique “Committed Intimate Relationship” Status 
Washington is the only community property state to have taken a 
status approach that views individuals involved in committed, intimate 
relationships as analogous to marital partners.96 Washington recognizes 
unmarried cohabitation as a legal status, but only for the limited purpose 
of property distribution upon dissolution of the relationship.97 The state’s 
property distribution scheme for unmarried cohabitants is the same for 
married couples, except that the scheme only applies to property acquired 
during the relationship.98 In Olver v. Fowler, the Washington Supreme 
Court created the concept of a “committed intimate relationship,” which 
resembles common law marriage but adds the element of intertwined 
financial affairs.99 Beginning with In re Marriage of Lindsey,100 the 
Washington Supreme Court started blending its treatment of married 
couples and unmarried cohabitants by adopting a rule requiring the “just 
and equitable” disposition of cohabitants’ property based on the nature of 
the relationship and property.101 The court takes into consideration factors 
such as whether the cohabitation was continuous, the duration and purpose 
of the relationship, and the pooling of resources and services for joint 
projects.102 The Washington method is an example of a creative solution 
to the inequity caused by disallowing property rights for unmarried 
cohabitants.  
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d. New Zealand’s Domestic Partnership Laws 
Other countries also employ a status approach to address property 
accrued during unmarried cohabitational relationships. In 2005, New 
Zealand created an institution of civil unions,103 which granted cohabitants 
full property rights similar to those married couples enjoy by imposing a 
legal status upon those couples that live together.104 The creation of this 
institution was prompted because one-fifth of all couples cohabiting in 
New Zealand were living in de facto marriages.105 New Zealand created a 
statutory regime for unmarried cohabitants in de facto marriages by 
incorporating them into the Property (Relationships) Act of 1976.106  
For a plaintiff to bring a claim, the de facto relationship must have 
lasted for at least three years.107 If the relationship is shorter than the 
requisite three years, however, the plaintiff may still have a claim if (1) a 
child was born of the de facto relationship or the applicant has made a 
substantial contribution to the de facto relationship, and (2) the court is 
satisfied that failure to provide the order would result in serious injustice 
to one of the parties.108 Upon separation, a de facto partner has three years 
to file an application for “divorce” with the court or his or her right to a 
claim expires.109 Upon dissolution, the court first looks globally at all of 
the couple’s property and divides that property into “relationship” and 
“separate” property.110 The court then divides the “relationship” property 
using the rules of equal property distribution.111 New Zealand recognized 
an inequity was created where one party, typically the female partner, 
leaves the relationship in a greatly disadvantaged financial position in 
terms of both income and living standards.112 As a solution to this problem, 
the New Zealand judiciary has the unique power to grant compensation in 
                                                                                                             
 103. Aloni, supra note 8, at 600.  
 104. Id. at 605.  
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cases of economic disparity.113 New Zealand’s imposition of a legal status 
shows that not only is the United States employing a status approach 
through common law marriage, the ALI’s Chapter 6 Principles, and 
Washington’s “committed intimate relationship,” but also that other 
countries are seeing the same rise in cohabitation and responding to 
inequities caused through the use of a legal status. 
2. The Marvin Contractual Approach  
The second approach to finding property rights for unmarried 
cohabitants is the contract approach, which California pioneered and many 
other states have followed.114 In 1976, the California Supreme Court 
decided the landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin, holding that express and 
implied contracts between cohabitants are valid.115 In this case, the 
plaintiff quit her job to be a “homemaker” in return for the defendant’s 
support.116 The plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant had entered into 
an oral agreement to live together, combine their earnings, and share 
equally in any property accumulated during the relationship.117 The 
California Supreme Court held that contracts between unmarried partners 
are enforceable unless those contracts are explicitly founded on sexual 
services similar to prostitution, which would violate public policy.118  
In the absence of an express contract, the court can inquire into the 
parties’ conduct to determine whether the court can find an implied 
contract or any other contractual remedy.119 The Marvin court 
acknowledged that a couple living together should have the right to 
contract with each other regarding property to prevent the inequity that 
could arise where the female cohabitant was left destitute when the male 
cohabitant, who produced all the earnings, exited the relationship.120 After 
Marvin, courts in other jurisdictions began to follow suit, using express or 
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implied contract remedies to address financial disputes between unmarried 
cohabitants.121 Most other American community property jurisdictions, 
such as Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin, use the 
Marvin approach to deal with the allocation of unmarried couples’ 
property on a contractual basis.122 Other than Washington, which employs 
the status approach, Louisiana is the only community property jurisdiction 
that prohibits contractual relationships between unmarried partners.123 
3. France’s Blending of the Intermediate Status and Contract 
Approach 
France has chosen to blend both the status and contract approaches to 
create a compromise solution.124 French cohabitants can register for a 
Parte Civile de Solidarite, or PACS, which is an intermediate status that 
“is neither a legal union nor a simple property contract. It is neither public 
nor private. It is neither for couples nor for pairs of friends. It is neither a 
legal recognition of . . . couples nor is it non-recognition.”125 Instead, 
PACS is popular because it is a status that allows for a simple form of 
partnership between two adults while providing the couple with a legal 
status.126 French law defines cohabitation as “a de facto stable and 
continuous relationship between two persons of different sexes or of the 
same sex living together as a couple.”127 Although originally drafted to 
create domestic partnership laws for homosexuals, this legislation also 
allows for heterosexual unions128 and has been widely successful among 
                                                                                                             
 121. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR., MAUREEN MCBRIEN & PATRICIA A. 
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CIV.] art. 515-1 (Fr.).  
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binding two adults of different sexes or of the same sex, in order to organize their 
common life.”); see also C. CIV. art. 515-8 (Fr.). 
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the heterosexual population in France. So far, millions of couples have 
chosen to register for PACS.129  
To form a PACS union, the couple registers in the presence of two 
witnesses at a city hall without any rituals,130 and then the Clerk of the 
Court of First Instance records the union.131 Contract law governs PACS 
unions, but the couple may convert a PACS union to marriage at any 
time.132 The marriage of either partner, mutual agreement between the 
partners, or unilateral request of one party after three months will 
terminate the PACS union.133 French law establishes mutual obligations to 
live together and provide assistance, but maintenance obligations are 
extinguished after dissolution.134 Whether through status, contract, or 
France’s unique blending of the two approaches, jurisdictions around the 
country and the globe have recognized the need to change outdated laws 
and provide unmarried cohabitants with property rights.  
III. PARAMOURS, CONCUBINES, AND “ILLICIT CONCUBINAGE” 
IN LOUISIANA 
In the midst of a barrage of solutions that other jurisdictions from 
around the country and the world provide, Louisiana remains obstinate 
with antiquated laws. In 1983, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided Schwegmann v. Schwegmann,135 holding that contracts between 
unmarried cohabitants are against public policy, and this case remains 
Louisiana’s unanimously cited authority regarding unmarried cohabitation.136 
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Louisiana retains a strict public policy that unmarried cohabitation is 
“concubinage,” which is immoral and should not be equal to the institution of 
marriage.137 This public policy, however, is at odds with modern society’s 
acceptance of cohabitation.138 Further, the policy of depriving cohabitants of 
property rights has not significantly furthered the state’s goal of promoting 
marriage. Therefore, Louisiana must change its archaic public policy 
regarding unmarried cohabitation. 
A. Louisiana’s Harsh Treatment of Cohabitation 
Although many other jurisdictions have provided viable solutions to 
the injustice caused by ignoring unmarried cohabitants, Louisiana has 
continued to ignore this inequity. Louisiana is the only community 
property state that does not recognize an avenue of recovery for property 
acquired during the time the couple lived together based on express or 
implied agreements.139 The practice of denying rights to cohabitants is 
rooted in slavery,140 as Louisiana refused to recognize relationships 
between whites and African Americans to discourage liaisons between 
white men and slaves.141 This policy required all unions between slaves to 
be informal marriages,142 and therefore the impact of not recognizing 
property rights of cohabitants fell heavily upon African-Americans.143 As 
the law’s racists origin behind a law is no longer legally acceptable, other 
reasons emerged for invalidating cohabitants’ relationships, and these 
reasons are currently in use. 
Louisiana courts reason that contracts resembling community property 
or a marriage between a man and a woman who live together are immoral 
and destructive to the lawful institution of marriage.144 Although the rest 
of the country simply uses the term “unmarried cohabitation,” Louisiana 
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uses the archaic term “concubinage.”145 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
defines concubinage as “a relationship of sexual content in which man and 
woman live together as husband and wife in a state approximating 
marriage.”146 Even though the legislature deleted the word “concubinage” 
from the Louisiana Civil Code in 1987, the courts still refer to cohabitation 
using this terminology.147 
Louisiana’s courts have clearly established that express or implied 
contracts between sexual partners are null if incidental to the 
cohabitation.148 Louisiana has refused, since the 1850s, to recognize 
agreements between couples that choose not to marry.149 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court has reasoned that sanctioning concubinage would be 
“repugnant to good morals and social order,”150 and that a taint from this 
type of illicit relationship would mortally affect the entire contract.151 If 
the relationship, motive, and purpose of contracting parties are that of 
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concubine152 and paramour,153 the court will not uphold the contract.154 If 
a concubine renders services that are “intertwined with her illegal 
cohabitation,” the court will find these services are indistinguishable from 
the relationship and will not allow the concubine to seek recompense.155  
Following this line of reasoning, the Fifth Circuit decided the seminal 
case regarding unmarried cohabitation in modern-day Louisiana. In 
Schwegmann,156 the court held that because the parties created a legal 
partnership based on a sexual relationship, the alleged agreement was 
meretricious and therefore void.157 The Schwegmann court ruled that 
because the oral agreement was between a paramour and a concubine 
engaged in sexual relations, the contract was invalid.158 The plaintiff, Ms. 
Blackledge, had no rights to the property through express or implied 
contract, equitable liens, or quantum meruit.159  
In Schwegmann, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the parties had an 
opportunity to marry and gain the resulting property rights, but they chose 
not to marry.160 The court reasoned that to find an implied contract between 
the couple would require characterizing an illicit relationship as a 
marriage.161 The court refused plaintiff’s claim that society’s values had 
changed so drastically as to create a need to protect cohabitants’ property 
rights.162 The court explained that Louisiana has a valid reason to discourage 
cohabitational relationships; these relationships erode the family, which the 
court asserted was the cornerstone of society.163 The court reasoned that 
equating concubinage with marriage would encourage an illegitimate 
relationship over the legitimate institution of marriage.164 Because the 
cohabitants voluntarily chose not to marry, the court reasoned, they should 
not have expected to receive the civil effects of marriage.165  
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In 2005, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed 
Schwegmann by holding that the contract in question was unenforceable, 
because its true cause was love, affection, and sex.166 The most recent 
Louisiana appellate case citing Schwegmann reasoned that if the parties’ 
intimate relationship was consideration for work performed, then the 
contract would be null.167 Louisiana courts have continuously upheld the 
principle that providing any of the benefits of marriage to a “mere 
cohabitant” will depreciate the lawful institution of marriage.168 In contrast 
to the modern American view that cohabitation is acceptable, under current 
Louisiana law, courts will not permit parties who make a pooling-of-
earnings contract to separate the contract from the “illicit sexual union.”169 
Louisiana’s position has often led to unjust results concerning cohabitants’ 
monetary and property rights at the end of such relationships.170 
B. The Eroded Rationale of Louisiana’s Negative Status Approach 
Because Louisiana courts still retain a firm grip on the negative status 
approach, inequity persists throughout the state.171 In Louisiana, cohabitation 
is seen as morally repugnant, and contracts between unmarried cohabitants—
or concubine and paramour, as Louisiana refers to these couples—are void.172 
Therefore, marriage is the only option with which to confer property rights 
from one partner to the other.173 Society’s views have changed so 
dramatically, however, that Louisiana’s public policy is now outdated, and 
penalizing cohabitants is not an effective means of promoting marriage.  
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1. Public Policy: The Alleged Immorality of Concubinage 
Louisiana courts have established that most onerous contracts between 
unmarried cohabitants are against public policy because these contracts are 
immoral.174 The Louisiana Civil Code forbids contracts if the cause of the 
agreement is contrary to public policy.175 Therefore, establishing whether 
these contracts are actually against public policy is vital. Louisiana’s law 
imposes, under the color of public policy, a sense of morality that not 
everyone shares.176 The authority for the conclusion in Schwegmann that a 
contract between unmarried persons would violate the public policy of “good 
morals” is weak, at best.177 The court implicitly compared cohabitation to 
prostitution, which is quite different from a modern couple living together and 
combining earnings.178 In Schwegmann, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
suggestion to allow contracts for cohabitants based on the rising social 
acceptance of these types of relationships “at this time.”179 Because this case 
is now 30 years old and is still being applied in a vastly different moral 
atmosphere, the time has finally come for Louisiana to overturn this decision. 
Even though Louisiana courts cite morality as the basis for their disdain 
of cohabitation, their reasoning is misguided and can cause more harm than 
good. From a general public policy perspective, the legislature should not base 
laws solely on morality considerations. This viewpoint is demonstrated in 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas,180 where she stated 
that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, moral 
considerations alone do not provide a rational basis for laws that discriminate 
between differing groups of people.181 Further, for the courts to say that many 
of the state’s citizens are immoral as a matter of law is problematic. Even if 
one finds morality to be a sufficient basis for a law, Louisiana’s current law is 
discriminatory because this law places women at a disadvantage.182 Most of 
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the cohabitation cases involve a woman dependent upon a man for 
support.183 Leaving these women destitute by allowing the man to renege 
on his promise to support and share property with her is unjust. Another 
unjust situation can arise when a working woman who has contributed 
financially to the property acquired during the relationship is left with 
diminished assets and no means of relief.184 
Society’s values have changed so considerably in the last 30 years that 
the public generally no longer views cohabitation as unequivocally illicit. 
Social acceptance of unmarried cohabitation continues to grow today,185 
and courts should not impose a standard based on morals that the public 
has largely abandoned.186 The country has also undergone a sexual 
revolution, which has disintegrated the main grounds for the earlier 
disapproval of cohabitation and helped to remove the stigma attached to 
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cohabitation.187 As cohabitation’s worldwide social acceptance continues 
to increase to the point where over 7.6 million romantic couples are 
cohabiting, Louisiana’s reasoning that condemns individuals’ choices to 
cohabit grows more dubious.188 Louisiana’s civil law was born out of the 
spirit of mutual respect and cooperation for the common good.189 
Louisiana ought to transform the law and continue this heritage of acting 
for the common good by protecting the person in the weaker bargaining 
position. The legislature should respond to the expectations of society and 
revoke the outdated laws condemning concubinage.190 Overall, Louisiana’s 
public policy is at odds with the rising number of cohabitants today and 
society’s transformed set of values. 
2. Guardians of the Sanctity of Marriage  
Louisiana justifies forbidding contracts and property rights for 
unmarried cohabitants because the protection of the institution of marriage 
is a significant state interest. The state fears that allowing cohabitants 
rights similar to the rights that arise under marriage would degrade the 
institution altogether.191 This notion of marriage as a “state interest” is 
peculiar when one considers the history of the institution of marriage, 
which started as a private custom between families, rather than one 
involving the state.192 The marriage contract used to only consist of an 
agreement between parties, cohabitation, and community recognition of 
their status.193 The requirement of a formal marriage is relatively recent in 
Anglo-American law.194 Therefore, this requirement casts doubt on this 
basis on which Louisiana continues to disallow contracts between 
cohabitants. 
Further, refusal to acknowledge these relationships does not fulfill the 
state’s purpose of furthering the institution of marriage.195 Louisiana’s 
public policy of discouraging concubinage to promote the institution of 
marriage is the primary obstacle to allowing property rights for unmarried 
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cohabitants.196 A slight shift in public policy away from the condemnation 
of concubinage and towards the promotion of marriage, however, makes 
this impediment unreasonable.197 In fact, cohabitation can actually help 
fulfill the state’s goal of promoting marriage. Cohabitation assists 
marriage by “laying the groundwork” for future wealth accumulation 
through the experience of managing a household budget.198 Studies show 
that those couples who cohabit before marrying are likely to experience a 
wealth premium that is twice as large as those who choose to marry 
without cohabiting first.199 
The state asserts it has an interest in promoting marriage and purports to 
protect this interest by denying sharing agreements in unstable relationships 
like cohabitation.200 Penalizing cohabitants by dismissing their contract 
claims has not resulted in a decrease in cohabiting couples or an increase in 
the number of marriages.201 The state justifies this agenda with the argument 
that stable relationships produce children and people who are less likely to be 
dependent on state aid.202 For the state to coerce heterosexual cohabitants into 
marriage, however, is no longer rational.203 Marriage has transformed from a 
long-term relationship to a short-term one, usually coupled with separate bank 
accounts, which makes past marital ideals increasingly irrelevant.204  
Historical notions of marriage involved antiquated gender roles—men as 
the breadwinners and women as homemakers.205 Marriage used to be 
necessary for women because the institution symbolized the traditional view 
of family life, legitimized children, and was sanctioned by religion.206 In 
contrast, the public conventionally viewed unmarried cohabitation as 
sinful.207 The increase in cohabitation, however, fails to detract from marriage, 
and cohabitation’s widespread acceptance makes viewing the partners’ choice 
not to marry as an attack on the institution itself implausible.208 Rather, 
                                                                                                             
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 1211.  
 198. Vespa & Painter, supra note 43, at 998.  
 199. Id.  
 200. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 839.  
 201. Mills, supra note 140, at 1218; see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, 
Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A Proposal for a More Perfect Union, 26 LOY. 
L. REV. 1, 27 (1980). 
 202. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 839.  
 203. Mills, supra note 140, at 1211–12. 
 204. Goldberg, supra note 76, at 538.  
 205. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 224.  
 206. King, supra note 101, at 555.  
 207. Id.; see supra Part II.A. 
 208. Blumberg, supra note 64, at 1296.  




couples can choose cohabitation, at least in the short term, without 
consciously denying marriage as either an alternative or likely outcome.209  
Many fear rights for cohabitants would weaken the state’s positive 
message about marriage in its laws and cause its citizens to view cohabitation 
as a more attractive choice than marriage.210 A surprising finding, however, is 
that although marriage rates have declined, desire to marry has not.211 Instead, 
most cohabitants express a desire to marry, but they cannot marry because 
they face obstacles to marriage, such as poverty and fear of conforming to 
stereotypical gender roles.212 Therefore, the state’s current public policy is not 
actually supported by results and should be changed.  
IV. UNMASKING THE SEXIST EFFECTS OF LOUISIANA’S LAWS 
REGARDING CONCUBINAGE 
In spite of Louisiana’s purported reasoning, the true reason for the 
state’s prohibition of property rights between unmarried romantic partners 
must be addressed. Clearly, a solution is warranted because the bases for 
Louisiana’s refusal to acknowledge contracts between cohabitants are 
antiquated, lack foundation in today’s society, and do not further the 
state’s goal of promoting marriage. Louisiana’s actions over the years and 
its refusal to change seem suspiciously at odds with modern values. 
Further, these actions are in opposition to changes to the Civil Code over 
the years and jurisprudence regarding issues other than property rights that 
involve unmarried cohabitants. A contract-based solution is the best fit for 
the state through a legislative contravention of Schwegmann. This new 
legislation would include a presumption of an equal sharing agreement 
between couples to aid the courts in unraveling property disputes. 
A. The Effects of Louisiana’s Laws Regarding Concubinage 
No justifiable reason appears to exist for Louisiana’s clinging to 
Schwegmann’s prohibition on unmarried cohabitants’ contracts. Most of 
Louisiana’s purported reasoning for its continued prohibitions is 
misguided and results in disproportionately sexist effects.213 One can see 
these effects in Louisiana’s jurisprudence, which involves courts denying 
women property rights and therefore leaving these women in a poorer 
economic position. One can also see sexist effects that result from the use 
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of the word “concubine” in jurisprudence that is still used to refer to 
women.214 These actions provide a vehicle for Louisiana to discriminate 
against women across the economic spectrum by refusing to afford 
protection. As discrimination and actions with sexist effects are certainly 
not valid bases for a law, Louisiana must change its law on cohabitation 
and so called “concubinage.”  
Defunct reasoning in the jurisprudence surrounding cohabitation leaves 
much room for speculation as to why Louisiana continues to refuse change. 
One possible reason the legislature has not changed the law is that the courts 
and the legislature want to avoid the difficult issues involved in the division 
of cohabitants’ property.215 Often contracts between cohabitants are oral, 
uncertain, and hard to prove without the benefits of the community property 
regime’s rules and presumptions to guide the partition of property.216 But 
this reason for denying reform is unfounded because legislative action 
would provide the needed certainty for the courts to untangle cohabitants’ 
assets.217 
The Louisiana Legislature and judiciary are causing sexist and 
discriminatory effects, which is perpetuated by Louisiana’s constant refusal 
to change. In the past, while the rest of the country allowed common law 
marriages, Louisiana called women concubines and punished them by 
depriving them of any property rights.218 Then, when the states that had 
repealed common law marriage decided to allow contractual remedies, 
Louisiana still chose to punish women and continues to do so today. 
Implications of sexism are apparent in the case law, which often 
involves a woman who is left in a worse condition financially upon 
dissolution of the relationship.219 Interestingly, a man has rarely brought a 
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claim seeking financial help after dissolution of the relationship,220 which 
is indicative of the real-life inequities that frequently occur.221 Women are 
generally the parties who seek spousal and child support, although men 
often lack the desire to pay for that support.222 Women are more frequently 
economically dependent upon men than men are on women.223 Property is 
more often titled in the man’s name.224 In other states, the few men who 
have brought cases in this area of the law have been criminal defendants 
alleging common law marriage to either strike the incriminating testimony 
of his “wife” or provide a defense in statutory rape cases.225 Ironically, 
even though under current Louisiana law courts award no benefits to 
cohabiting women, cohabitation is taken into account when the effect is 
punitive to women.226 Although women cannot win a successful claim for 
alimony for cohabiting “in the manner of married persons,” they can lose 
alimony for the very same practice.227 
The archaic language used to describe women in the jurisprudence 
further demonstrates sexism. The effect of the degrading description of 
women who choose cohabitation over marriage as “concubines” might 
possibly be negated if the cohabiting man had a similar title, but instead 
the courts describe him as a “paramour.”228 Evidence of unequal treatment 
of the sexes is seen in the court opinions that discuss and condemn the 
wrongdoing of the “concubine” but pay little attention to the actions of the 
“paramour.” 
Another illustration of sexism in Louisiana’s law regarding unmarried 
cohabitants is evident in sociological research. Data shows that women are 
the ones pushing for cohabitation, and by forcing marriage as the only 
avenue to confer property rights between partners, the law is 
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discriminating against those who prefer cohabitation—poor women and 
career women.229 This discriminatory effect has even been pointed out to 
the courts.230 One appellant noted that the courts should dissipate the 
stigma of “concubine” due to the absurd results created.231 This appellant 
also reasoned that such rulings under Louisiana law would be unfair to 
single, working women.232 A related issue is that even though 90% of 
cohabiting women expect to and want to marry,233 poor or disadvantaged 
couples face significant barriers or obstacles to marriage.234 Refusing to 
provide protection for unmarried cohabitants causes the law to 
discriminate against those who cannot, or do not, get married.  
Women also need protection under Louisiana’s laws because of the 
threat of unequal bargaining power. Money is power in a relationship, and 
shared power is often the crux of successful intimate relationships.235 This 
fact is supported by findings that a woman’s income will matter less than 
a man’s income if she does not spend her money on resources that translate 
into power.236 Women benefit more than men from spending money on 
household items that are often associated with “woman’s work.”237 
Women are more likely than men to spend money on resources that will 
benefit the family and children, in stark contrast to men, who spend more 
money on indulgence items.238 One study found that women are 
responsible for almost all payments for consumables, such as clothing, 
food, child care, school-related costs, and medical and dental 
expenditures.239 Meanwhile, men are more likely to spend most of their 
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money on alcohol, motor vehicles, vacations, and gambling.240 Therefore, 
women’s expenditures may be less consequential to household bargaining, 
or power.241 Women’s income may be discounted more in cohabitations if 
their bargaining power, undercut by societal gender inequalities, is further 
undermined by other factors. These factors include lesser commitment and 
lower exit costs for unmarried unions and a lack of legal protection for the 
partner with lower income, usually the woman, when the cohabitation 
ends.242 Thus, the state should provide some sort of legal scheme to protect 
these women in cohabiting relationships. 
B. Lack of Legal Grounds for the State’s Purported “Public Policy” 
Condemning Cohabitation 
Another basis for a belief that the legislature’s actions, which 
disproportionately affect women, are unfounded and need to be changed 
are the shifts in the Louisiana Civil Code and in other areas of the state’s 
jurisprudence that do not support the courts’ harsh treatment of unmarried 
cohabitants. Over time, Louisiana courts have relaxed restraints on certain 
arrangements between unmarried persons, although this process has 
occurred slowly.243 For example, in the jurisprudence, cohabitant women 
have been able to recover for worker’s compensation and as beneficiaries 
of life insurance policies.244 In a worker’s compensation case, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated that it was unable to find a general 
legislative policy signifying a need to punish cohabitants by depriving 
them of all benefits or rights whatsoever based on their status as 
cohabitants.245 
Changes to the Louisiana Civil Code also indicate a shift away from the 
legislature’s harsh treatment of unmarried cohabitants. For example, the 
legislature repealed Louisiana Civil Code article 161, which prohibited 
marriage between adulterer and mistress, allowing these partners to legalize 
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their relationship.246 The legislature also repealed section 79.1 of the 
Criminal Code, which formerly criminalized “common law marriages,”247 
thereby making concubinage no longer a crime in Louisiana.248 Though 
limited in effect, the legislature repealed Louisiana Civil Code article 1481, 
which restricted donations of movables and immovables between those 
couples who lived together without marrying.249 Equating concubinage with 
remarriage, the legislature also made cohabitation a further basis for 
terminating spousal support in addition to remarriage.250 Further, the 
legislature changed the wording of this article from “open concubinage” 
to “cohabited with another person of either sex in the manner of married 
persons.”251 This change effectively took the terminology of 
“concubinage” out of the Civil Code.252 Taken together, all of these 
changes coalesce into one idea—in modern society, cohabitants should be 
able to contract between themselves. The trend has moved away from a 
qualified disapproval of concubinage toward recognition that the 
legislature should afford unmarried cohabitants certain rights and benefits 
under the law.253 
C. Previous Failed Solutions to the Inequity in Louisiana’s Law  
Despite the changes in the law relaxing a strict condemnation of 
unmarried cohabitation, Louisiana’s decision to retain its strict policy 
against providing property rights for unmarried cohabitants is certainly 
curious. In fact, many have noticed the inequities this lack of rights can 
cause and have proposed dozens of solutions.254 Louisiana, however, 
continues to ignore these proposals. Louisiana rejected California’s 
Marvin approach255 as well as a proposed Civil Code article that would 
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have allowed contracts between unmarried cohabitants.256 The state has 
also ignored numerous legal scholars’ solutions to the unfair treatment of 
cohabitants.257 Finally, in 2004, Louisiana passed the Defense of Marriage 
amendment to the Louisiana Constitution, which refused to allow any 
marriage-like status to cohabitants.258 These examples of the refusal of 
Louisiana courts, legislature, and constituents to change an antiquated law 
to adapt to the expectations of modern society are antithetical to what the 
state should do—give women equality and freedom regarding their 
property.  
1. Rejection of Marvin 
First, through the Schwegmann decision in 1983, Louisiana rejected 
the use of Marvin’s contractual remedies to provide relief for the lower 
earning partner after dissolution of a cohabiting relationship.259 The Fifth 
Circuit examined Marvin but dismissed the rationale of the case, saying 
that the social acceptance of non-marital sexual relationships was not a 
justifiable ground to abandon the “Louisiana concept of the unlawfulness 
of a concubinage relationship.”260 Although courts continue to cite to 
Schwegmann’s reasoning, the social and moral climate of the state has 
changed so drastically in the last 30 years that this answer is no longer 
acceptable.261  
2. The Rejection of Proposed Article 101 in the Wake of the Repeal 
of Article 1481 
In the wake of Schwegmann’s ban on contracts between unmarried 
cohabitants, the Persons Committee of the Louisiana Law Institute proposed 
a new Civil Code article 101 to allow sharing agreements between 
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unmarried persons, regardless of gender, so long as the agreements are in 
writing.262 The Committee considered many options, ranging from a 
positive statement that contracts between unmarried cohabitants were 
unenforceable to the adoption of common law marriage, before finally 
deciding to propose article 101.263 This article would have preserved the 
uniqueness of marriage while satisfying the reasonable expectations of 
cohabitants who intended and agreed that their relationship should have 
legal consequences.264 
Proposed article 101 was defeated in the Senate.265 Strangely enough, 
the legislature was willing to repeal a Civil Code article prohibiting 
gratuitous contracts of donation between unmarried cohabitants—article 
1481.266 The pivotal question revolved around “whether onerous contracts 
between unmarried cohabitants, when not independent of the sexual 
relationship, [would] remain contrary to public policy and null under 
article 1968.”267 From the repeal of article 1481, courts could have inferred 
that some contracts, specifically donations between cohabitants, were no 
longer against public policy and no longer subject to invalidation under 
article 1968.268 In repealing article 1481, the legislature seemingly 
intended to make a broader statement about the public policy concerning 
cohabitation in general.269 When viewed in connection with the rejection 
of enforceable contracts between unmarried cohabitants, however, the 
repeal of article 1481 suggested a less expansive legislative intent.270 
The legislature, by refusing to adopt a provision on cohabitation, 
apparently intended to allow the jurisprudence surrounding article 1481 to 
continue in effect.271 The rejection of article 101 confirmed that the law still 
favors marriage over cohabitation.272 Therefore, cohabitants’ contracts 
remained subject to antiquated notions of public policy that evolved from 
religious beliefs and opposition to interracial relationships.273 The rejection 
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of article 101 suggests that the legislature did not wish to extend to 
cohabitants the option of entering into a relationship similar to marriage but 
governed by contract law rather than family law.274 This rejection made 
clear that courts will not enforce all contracts between cohabitants but did 
not preclude otherwise enforceable contracts as long as they do not violate 
public policy.275 
3. Commentary Calling for Change 
Several commentators have written law review articles both 
recognizing this inequity and proposing a solution, but the legislature has 
ignored these attempts and refuses to provide any sort of remedy for 
cohabitants. For example, shortly after Marvin, Duke University Professor 
William A. Reppy, Jr. proposed an intermediate status approach for 
Louisiana cohabitants.276 Immediately following the rejection of article 
101, Catherine Mills, a law student, proposed a “sliding scale” for 
contracts that should no longer be against public policy.277 As recently as 
2013, Erez Aloni, a Fellow at Columbia Law School, proposed a registered 
relationship status for unmarried cohabitants similar to the French 
PACS.278 Louisiana’s inflexible will and failure to consider any of these 
viable solutions show evidence of discriminatory effects.279 
4. Louisiana’s 2004 Defense of Marriage Amendment 
The most recent legislative expression regarding unmarried cohabitants’ 
property rights was the 2004 Defense of Marriage Amendment (“DOMA”) to 
the Louisiana Constitution.280 DOMA does not expressly prevent unmarried 
persons from using partnership laws or the general obligations provisions of 
the Louisiana Civil Code to contract a regime similar to the legal 
community.281 DOMA, however, does provide in relevant part, “[a] legal 
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”282 Therefore, the Louisiana 
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Constitution removes all options of a status-based solution, unless the 
public repeals or further amends DOMA. The only remaining remedy is 
grounded in contract law, but Louisiana has thus far refused to overrule 
Schwegmann and its progeny.  
D. The Solution: A Presumption of Equality 
When searching for a solution to this discrimination problem, one 
must remember that cohabiting relationships are varied in nature, so no 
one approach is perfectly suited.283 But the legislature should not force 
couples choosing a cohabiting relationship into the ill-fitting laws of 
marriage, thereby ruling out a status approach.284 Coupled with DOMA’s 
implied prohibition of a status approach, the only remaining remedy is to 
employ a contract approach. Louisiana Civil Code article 2801, which 
allows contracts “between two or more persons to combine their efforts or 
resources in determined proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk for 
their common profit or commercial benefit,”285 would justify this 
approach.  
The legislature should enact a new Civil Code article that would allow 
unmarried cohabitants to expressly contract between each other, thereby 
legislatively overruling Schwegmann.286 The contract would need to be 
express but would not have to be in writing, as practicality and the 
jurisprudence indicates that most couples do not write out these 
agreements.287 Further, Louisiana should create a presumption of an 
agreement between unmarried cohabitants to split property accumulated 
during the relationship equally. This presumption would solve the inequity 
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between partners by shifting the burden to the party claiming that the 
partners did not have such an agreement. Almost every other jurisdiction 
in the United States has provided property rights for unmarried 
cohabitants. With this in mind, Louisiana must provide a remedy for 
cohabiting women. If the legislature fails to adopt this change, both the 
legislature and the courts should consider all other options to provide 
women some remedy. Both branches of Louisiana’s government have 
plenty of options and models to follow, so no excuse exists for Louisiana 
to refuse protection for unmarried cohabiting women any longer.  
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has demonstrated the various methods with which to 
fix a lack of property rights for unmarried cohabitants. Louisiana can no 
longer fail to provide the rights by hiding behind antiquated reasoning. A 
public policy at odds with modern society’s values is a dangerous cycle 
that provides a pathway for the state to disproportionately affect women 
in what appears to be a discriminatory manner. Contracts between 
cohabitants are no longer against public policy and therefore Louisiana 
Civil Code article 1968 should not subject these contracts to invalidation. 
This state of affairs cannot stand, and the legislature should enact a new 
Civil Code article with a presumption of an equal sharing agreement. In 
1983, the Schwegmann court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that 
society’s values had changed enough “at this time” to demonstrate a need 
to protect unmarried cohabitants’ property.288 Over 30 years later, is it time 
yet, Louisiana?  
 
Brittanie Wagnon 
                                                                                                             
 288. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326 (“Furthermore, we do not believe the 
prevalence and social acceptance of non-marital sexual relationships at this time 
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